The reported announcement at the weekend by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra that Thailand would end the use of buffer zones made up of the minority peoples living along the Burmese border will probably go down as one of the worst foreign policy blunders this country has committed in recent memory.
In a move designed to appease the ruling generals in Rangoon, Mr Thaksin betrayed Thailand's national interests by riding roughshod over the army's drug suppression efforts and by forfeiting political leverage to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
Mr Thaksin's latest foreign policy misadventure also raises alarming questions about the motives behind Thailand's appeasement policy vis-a-vis the Rangoon junta. Why has our prime minister been bending over backwards to kowtow to the Burmese generals?
It is always advisable to pursue amicable relations with the neighbour who shares our longest border. And so Mr Thaksin's stated objective of friendlier relations with Rangoon is justifiable theoretically. But, in practice, the SPDC has yet to prove its worth as a friend.
In particular, its alliance with the United Wa State Army, the largest methamphetamine producer and peddler in mainland Southeast Asia, has undermined Thailand's national interest.
It is common knowledge that Thailand's methamphetamine scourge originates in the UWSA's autonomous territory along our northern border. Lest we forget, the flow of methamphetamines is a menace to Thai society. It puts an entire generation of younger Thais at risk. It breaks up families, increases health care costs, and jeopardises future human resources.
In short, what the Wa have been doing to Thailand, with Rangoon`s complicity, constitutes a national security threat. This is why the 3rd Army has beefed up its suppression efforts in the North, and it is precisely why Mr Thaksin has made drug suppression a cornerstone of his domestic policy.But the prime minister has been disinclined to attack the drug menace at its source. In fact, the Thaksin government's appeasement policy towards Rangoon runs counter to its drug suppression objectives at home.
Instead of maintaining a firm stand against the junta on the Wa's drug production, as the army has done, Mr Thaksin and his advisers have preferred to play second fiddle to the Burmese junta.
These generals may be pariahs in the international community, but they are assured of the upper hand when dealing with the Thaksin government. Any time they are upset with something emanating from Thai territory, all the junta has to do is seal the border and launch a tirade against the Thai authorities and the Thai people. They then find the Thaksin government suing for peace in no time.
It is not surprising that Burma's state media have depicted Thais as spiritually weak. In the eyes of the junta, the Thaksin government must seem morally bankrupt, beholden to any Rangoon whim or preference. Whatever political leverage Thailand had accumulated over the SPDC in the past has been completely squandered by the Thaksin government.
Given its destructive impact, the eradication of the Wa's methamphetamine trade should form the point of departure in Thailand's policy towards the Burmese government and the various minority groups straddling the border.Those who share Thailand's interest in wiping out the Wa's drug production should be considered natural allies. Those who pursue drug production, explicitly or implicitly, should be seen as mortal enemies. Indeed, drug suppression should be Thailand's overriding strategic and operational objective.
The Thai army appears cognisant of this objective, whereas Mr Thaksin's accusation that the army has overreacted to the shelling of Thai soil and his intended abandoning of the buffer zone policy suggest he has other objectives in mind.
Because they are at odds with both Rangoon and the Wa, the Shan State Army and the Karen National Union two minority insurgency groups fighting for autonomy should be treated as natural allies. The Thai authorities are inept if they look upon the SSA and KNU as enemies. To think otherwise is to fly in the face of common sense.
Mr Thaksin should be given a textbook on International Relations 101. States have fought proxy wars for centuries. Buffer zones are commonplace in the brutal arena of geopolitics. The United States, in its continuing war on terrorism, has picked sides among the many warlords in the treacherous battlefields of Afghanistan. Thailand is no different.
If the SSA can keep the Wa off-balance, its efforts should be condoned, especially when the SPDC itself has been unwilling to rein in the Wa's drug production. The SPDC's tacit approval of the Wa's methamphetamine trade renders it a partner in crime bent on poisoning Thailand's future generations. It is as much interference in Thai affairs as Thailand's indirect support of the minority insurgency groups who share Thai interests is an intrusion in Burmese matters.Of course, as pointed out by Gen Surayud Chulanont, army commander-in- chief, and his aides, Thailand's policy of having buffer zones ended years ago. But if it were still operational, it would be no different to the SPDC's direct support of the Wa and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army.
Any cordial bilateral relationship is a two-way street. If the SPDC wants something, it should be willing to give something in return.The ruling generals have ignored the reciprocal obligations of friendship because the Thaksin government has trodden too softly with them.
A charitable interpretation of Mr Thaksin's soft (or weak, in the SPDC's view) stance on the latest Thai-Burmese spat would suggest that the prime minister has simply been na{AAC}ve and misguided, lacking cogent and coherent foreign policy advice.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is a lecturer in international relations with Chulalongkorn University's Faculty of Political Science.