The recent border skirmishes between Thailand and Burma are not the first to erupt between the two neighbours, and they certainly won't be the last.
When Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra took office early last year, Thai officials had hoped there would be an end to the cycle of mutually damaging confrontations between these two historical enemies. Applying a personal, business-centred approach to relations with his country's western neighbour, tycoon-turned-PM Thaksin believed he could ease long-standing tensions. So far, however, he has failed to end the violence and the seemingly endless recriminations coming from both sides.
In a bid to put relations on a more amicable footing, the Thaksin administration has invited two Burmese leaders to Bangkok. Last August, Mr Thaksin rolled out the red carpet for powerful intelligence chief Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt, and this April he feted Gen Maung Aye, the junta's second in command.
Academics at Chulalongkorn University hailed the Khin Nyunt visit as the beginning of a new era in Thai-Burma relations. Mr Thaksin was clearly determined to break with the past in his efforts to mend fences with Rangoon.Instead of leveling the oft-repeated accusation that the Burmese generals were turning a blind eye to drug production on their side of the border, Mr Thaksin offered Rangoon 20 million baht in assistance for its drug-suppression programme.The Burmese junta repaid the favour with the release of 60 Thai prisoners a goodwill gesture which critics say has since become something of a ritual.
Ironically, despite Thaksin's eschewal of the openly critical attitude of his predecessor, Chuan Leekpai, Thailand's relations with Burma have worsened noticeably during the current administration's tenure.
Since Mr Thaksin came to power in February 2001, Burma has twice shut the border over alleged Thai army support for anti-Rangoon insurgents. Clearly, Mr Thaksin's attempts to win over the generals in Rangoon by appealing to their economic self-interest have not worked to resolve the complex differences that divide the two sides.
MUTUAL MISTRUST
At the heart of the conflict between Thailand and Burma is mutual mistrust over the issue of insurgency groups operating along their border. Bangkok believes pro-Rangoon groups have been given a free hand to engage in illegal activities that are harming Thai society. The Burmese junta, meanwhile, has accused Bangkok of harbouring anti-Rangoon ``terrorists'' in an attempt to undermine Burma's stability.
Much of this distrust has been fostered by mixed signals from both sides.
At times, Thailand seems to be at cross-purposes with itself. While the Thaksin administration has sought to maintain a conciliatory stance, the country's military and media appear to favour a firmer response to Burma's perceived affronts to Thai sovereignty.To further complicate matters, the Thais seem to be at a loss to ascertain the true balance of power within the Burmese junta. For despite its monolithic appearance, the regime is broadly divided between hardliners who back Gen Maung Aye and and moderates who back Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt.
Bangkok's decision to extend an invitation to Gen Maung Aye this April was in part an acknowledgement of the need for even-handedness in dealing with the rival generals. It may also have been based on the calculation that Gen Maung Aye's star is on rise.Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt's close association with the family of former dictator Ne Win, whose son-in-law and grandsons are now on trial for allegedly plotting to overthrow the regime, has made him vulnerable to a power play by his enemies within the junta.
Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt is also close to the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the group Bangkok accuses of flooding Thailand with methamphetamines. Bangkok may have hoped that Gen Maung Aye would make a better ally in its fight to curtail the UWSA's trafficking activities.
During his four-day visit, Gen Maung Aye and his Thai counterparts discussed a number of key bilateral issues, such as drug trafficking, border demarcation and Burmese refugees, as well as trade and agriculture. He also vowed to shut down the Hong Pang Company, identified by Thailand as a money-laundering front for the UWSA.No sooner had Gen Maung Aye returned to Rangoon, however, than the sound of gunfire was heard once again along the northern stretch of the border. A spokesman for the junta, Lt-Col San Pwint, saw little irony in this coincidence. He told reporters in Rangoon: ``The fact that such an untoward incident was timed to break out on the very day that a friendly visit by a Myanmar [Burmese] leader was concluded points unerringly to the fact that there is a scheme or plot to derail the smooth and friendly relations between the two countries. It is also evident that the members of the lower echelons of the Thai army are involved in dishonest intrigues.''
And so the finger pointing began. On the Thai side, there were reports in both the Thai- and English-language media that Gen Maung Aye had given Bangkok the green light to go after the Wa. But most analysts said that it was unlikely Gen Maung Aye would give such permission, as it would compromise Burma's national sovereignty.
Maj-Gen Kyaw Win, the junta's deputy military intelligence chief who accompanied Gen Maung Aye on the trip, also vigorously denied the Thai claims. True or not, however, observers in Rangoon said the Thai reports and the subsequent outbreak of border clashes had seriously hurt Gen Maung Aye's credibility among top brass at home.
One possible scenario for what actually happened during Gen Maung Aye's visit to Bangkok is that the Burmese general gave a vaguely encouraging response when the Thais tried to sound him out on the idea of allowing a cross-border assault on the Wa. But even that is unlikely, as Gen Maung Aye is not known for speaking elliptically.
At most, he would have offered bland assurances that Burma would crack down on the Wa if Thailand prevented the anti-Rangoon Shan State Army (SSA) from launching attacks from Thai soil. When it became clear that the Burmese were not serious about shutting down the Hong Pang Company _ it simply closed a few of its offices in border towns, the Thai army may have lost patience and decided it was time to take matters into its own hands.
COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN
The possible misunderstanding between Gen Maung Aye and his Thai hosts is not the only instance of poor communications plaguing bilateral relations.
In both countries, there appear to be problems in maintaining the chains of command between the capital and the border. On the Burmese side, the death of Lieutenant-General Tin Oo, the chief of staff, in a helicopter crash last year is rumoured to have created a vacuum between the War Office in Rangoon and regional commanders.
And on the Thai side, army chief Gen Surayud Chulanont appears to be chafing under the restraints imposed on him by Gen Chavalit, who is widely regarded as a friend of the Burmese junta.
Gen Surayud's staunch defence of Thai sovereignty against Burmese incursions has won him strong popular support, making him an unwelcome foil for the softer approach advocated by Mr Thaksin and Gen Chavalit. Some analysts have suggested that Gen Surayud's integrity and the nationalistic sentiment stoked by border clashes could even be used to rehabilitate the military as a political player.
Adding to the static, the media in both Thailand and Burma have played up the recent conflict to the maximum. On the Thai side, the press has generally come out strongly against Mr Thaksin's talk-softly Burma policy. Stung by his perceived attempts to roll back press freedoms, the Thai media have portrayed the PM's handing of the clashes as weak and possibly economically motivated, noting that his Shin Satellite Co recently signed a contract with Rangoon worth about $13 million (540 million baht).
On the Burmese side, the state-run press has been predictably shrill in its denunciation of the Thais. The junta's mouthpiece press has invoked ``lessons from history'' to portray Burma's closest neighbour as a nation of inveterate liars _ a charge also made by Maj-Gen Kyaw Win, who accused the Thai leadership of telling ``bare-faced lies'' about its policy of harbouring anti- Rangoon insurgents on Thai soil.
Privately owned publications, meanwhile, have been instructed not to run articles on ``Yodaya'' a derogatory reference to the ancient Thai kingdom of Ayutthaya, which was overrun by the Burmese in 1767. One magazine, Living Color, was forced to avoid all mention of Thailand in a cover story on Asean. Advertisements for Thai companies have also been strictly forbidden.
In stark contrast to Mr Thaksin's repeated urging to the Thai people not to overreact to Burmese provocations, Rangoon has taken great pains to fan the flames of anti-Thai sentiment, with little effect. While the junta has staged rallies around the country to denounce Thailand's alleged treachery, very few Burmese have expressed any antipathy towards their eastern neighbour.
In major cities, where residents have been ordered to fly the Burmese flag in front of their homes and business premises, the Thai-bashing campaign has inspired only the most apathetic of responses. Observers say that most urban Burmese are more interested in gambling and watching the World Cup football tournament than in joining the junta's anti-Thai tirade.In border areas, meanwhile, many have expressed regret at Thailand's reluctance to rise to Rangoon's persistent baiting. In predominantly ethnic areas, public opinion echoes that of most Thais: ``Why does Bangkok put up with it?'' Rebel leaders are more strident. ``If the Thais want to invade Burma, we will lead the way,'' the head of one ethnic group told The Irrawaddy on condition of anonymity.
LETTING OFF STEAM
While the border situation has turned into a major imbroglio for Mr Thaksin, its implications for Burma's domestic politics could prove even worse. Ominously, in the wake of this latest conflict, the state-run press has renewed its attacks on the democratic opposition, albeit in a relatively muted fashion.
An article in the Burmese-language Kyemon newspaper claimed that: ``The entire [Burmese] people, especially the youth, became embittered and rankled by Thailand's encroachment on their sovereignty.'' It goes on to note an exception to this supposedly universal outrage: ``However, a clear blank can be seen in the political arena of Burma. That is the group of the people who are shouting for democracy and human rights [who] have not said anything or issued any statement about this matter. That is food for thought.''
Mr Thaksin's efforts to establish friendlier ties with Rangoon will inevitably fail if he does not begin to take Burma's political dynamics into account. For his purposes, this means recognising that the Burmese junta needs external enemies as much as it needs friends as a pretext for suppressing the far more serious threat of internal dissent.With the regime still under pressure to make further concessions to the opposition, it should come as no surprise that it would choose this time to let off some steam along the border. Only a greater appreciation of the depths of Burma's domestic discontent, and the junta's desperation to hold on to power at any cost, will prevent Mr Thaksin getting burned again.
- Aung Zaw is the editor of the Irrawaddy magazine.