Battling for Power in Burma

Stratfor Global Intelligence Update(October 15, 2000)

Last month, at a session of the United Nations Security Council, the United States condemned the Burmese government for its crackdown on pro-democracy activists. While consistent with U.S. policy, Washington’s sentiment was unusual since the administration tends to put Burma on its diplomatic back burner.But the U.S. statement, whether intended for intervention or simply political posturing for domestic consumption, comes at a particularly delegate time for the country once known as Burma. Burma has drawn a flood of attention from human rights advocates and pro-democracy lobbyists because of what many feel is the Burmese government’s harassment of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

The power struggle between Burma’s ruling military government and Suu Kyi, the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner, will do more than get Burma a few headlines. Rather, its outcome will affect the balance of power in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

Burma has been run by the military for nearly 30 years, notwithstanding a few scattered elections, whose results the military rigged or ignored. Under economic sanctions by the United States and Europe, Burma has followed the path of North Korea, closing itself off to the outside world and watching its economy crumble.

But former dictator General Ne Win who still influences the government through a complex patronage system is 89-years-old and gradually losing his power. Senior General Than Shwe, who runs the government as prime minister, is set to retire, most likely due to illness.

Two men are battling to take the reins of power General Maung Aye, head of the armed forces, and Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt, who runs the secret police.

Khin Nyunt leads a group of younger officers who want to open Burma up to Western investment. To do so probably means easing restrictions on the opposition National League for Democracy. The intelligence chief probably isn’t a pro-Western liberal; he reportedly has ties to Burma’s major drug lords. But the odds are good he will make a tidy profit from any investment.

Maung Aye is a taciturn soldier who shuns the spotlight. His views are less pronounced, but he appears to wish to keep Burma on its current course.

The power struggle takes on a geostrategic dimension due to Burma’s location at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea and the shipping routes between Asia and the Persian Gulf. China has had military relations with Burma since 1988, and rival India has attempted to push China out of Burma.

Khin Nyunt favors increased ties with China, but Maung Aye is less certain about the relationship he’s concerned about Beijing’s influence and that of thousands of ethnic Chinese who live in northern Burma. If Khin Nyunt takes power, China maintains and probably increases its intelligence and naval presence in Burma. But Maung Aye wants to balance China, and would likely increase ties with India.

But back to the original question why did the United States suddenly pay attention to Burma? One answer is that Washington was simply acknowledging the cries of the human rights and pro-democracy lobbyists, and doing so in a relatively cost-free way.

The other answer is a bit subtler. Khin Nyunt’s pro-investment policies associate him with the United States and the West. But Khin Nyunt looks bad if Washington openly criticizes the regime. And the United States would definitely want to make Burma’s biggest China backer look bad.

In all likelihood, the United States government probably isn’t that subtle. Washington was probably responding to domestic political pressure. But the unintended consequences may prove a setback to Khin Nyunt and China.