Sanctions Revisited
source : The Irrawaddy News Magazine
After more than a decade, the debate over the use of sanctions to push for political change in Burma remains as contentious as ever.
by Min Zin
As the Burmese economy shows new signs of being in serious trouble, the use of economic sanctions to push the country's pariah rulers towards reform has met with renewed interest. Not surprisingly, views on this issue remain sharply divided, especially in light of secret talks that have been taking place between the ruling junta and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi since last October.
In early April, the European Union decided to extend by another six months its sanctions against the Burmese regime, including an arms embargo and bans on non-humanitarian aid and visas for members of the junta. Very soon after the EU move, however,Japan indicated that it would provide US $28 million to repair a hydroelectric dam built with Japanese war reparations money in the 1950s, signaling that Tokyo was ready to reward the regime for taking part in the talks, despite the lack of any evidence of real progress.
Since 1988, when the military suppressed a nationwide pro-democracy uprising with brutal force, most donor nations and multilateral lending agencies have cut all non-humanitarian aid to Burma to put pressure on the new regime. In 1990, the junta responded to domestic and international calls for national elections, only to ignore the results when it was faced with a crushing defeat at the polls.
By the late 1990s, the junta's continued refusal to transfer power to the electoral victor, the National league for Democracy (NLD), added weight to arguments that more pressure, not less, was needed. In May 1997, the Clinton administration imposed a ban on future American investments in Burma, and the EU also introduced its own punitive measures in 1996, 1997 and 1999. More recently, in November 2000, the International Labor Organization (ILO) turned up the heat on the regime for its widespread use of forced labor, making an unprecedented call on member states and workers' and employers' associations to "review" their relations with Burma, possibly setting the stage for a new round of sanctions.
While support for sanctions has gained momentum in much of the world, closer to home, advocates of economic penalties against the regime have faced an uphill struggle, as Burma's regional neighbors seek to bring the long-isolated and resource-rich country into their respective spheres of influence. Japan, India, China and the Association of Southeast Nations (Asean) have ranged from being reluctant to openly disdainful in their responses to calls to impose sanctions on a country that has much to offer. Even Thailand, which has long borne the brunt of its neighbor's recalcitrance, generally favors working together with the regime, rather than isolating it. This position was recently reiterated by new Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai, who suggested that Thailand needed "to encourage economic development instead of cornering Myanmar (Burma) and continuing sanctions".
"I do not believe the time is ripe for major aid to Burma, but I do
believe that it is time for real humanitarian assistance."
David I. Steinberg, head of the Asian Studies department at Georgetown University
Seen in this context, some activists in Burma and in exile argue that Japan's haste to "reward" the junta was not merely premature, but fundamentally wrong, being based more on national self-interest (namely, a desire to retain influence in this strategically important country) than a genuine desire to promote political progress.
But the real issue, say most activists, is timing. The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, the democratic government in exile, has warned that any easing of pressure on the regime at this time would only serve to reinforce the generals' belief that substantive political reform is not necessary. Simply mitigating oppressive practices is not enough to warrant any sort of reward, say activists; there must also be a genuine and irreversible move to restore democratic rule before sanctions are lifted.
Even experts who do not generally support sanctions agree that timing is a key issue. David I. Steinberg, head of the Asian Studies department at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, told The Irrawaddy: "I do not believe the time is ripe for major aid to Burma, but I do believe that it is time for real humanitarian assistance."
Drawing a line between aid to the regime and humanitarian assistance for the Burmese people is no easy matter, however. Japan, for instance, has characterized its planned disbursement of aid to Rangoon as humanitarian assistance, arguing that a lack of electricity creates undue hardship for the general public. Indeed, determining who genuinely benefits from aid is as contentious an issue as the question of who really suffers from sanctions, something that is almost impossible to know with certainty in the absence of reliable economic data. This has not, however, prevented various interested parties from making claims about the impact, or lack thereof, of sanctions on ordinary Burmese.
When the ILO announced its unprecedented move to censure the regime last November, the business community in Burma was quick to describe a doomsday scenario that would devastate the lives of ordinary citizens. In an open letter, the Myanmar Chamber of Commerce and Industry pleaded with the ILO not to impose further sanctions: "With the imposition of restrictions and sanctions, the international trading and business activities in Myanmar, of which we form the cornerstone, will be crippled and widespread national economic decline will occur," read the letter.
Despite such dire warnings, however, business leaders in Burma routinely claim that they are not personally hurt by sanctions. This echoes the view held by the regime that it can withstand sanctions indefinitely, even as it devotes most of its energies in international forums to lobbying for their removal.
As inconsistent as this may seem, however, some observers believe that the regime's insistence that it is relatively unaffected by sanctions may be close to the truth. "I would say sanctions hurt the people,and less radically affect the short-term interests of the regime," remarked Burma expert Prof Robert Taylor in response to a recent query. "The government always has the capacity to ensure that it gets enough of what it needs to stay in power. That is the nature of government."
"If company X walks out, company Y will come in."
a Rangoon-based Burmese economist
Advocates of sanctions, on the other hand, argue that the power structure of Burmese society, rather than the absence of foreign aid or investment, is what keeps most Burmese in a state of endemic poverty. Just as all power accrues to a small, military-connected elite, so too does all wealth, leaving ordinary people to survive on whatever is left. Thus NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi could claim "with absolute confidence" that "the general public of Burma would be very little affected, if at all, by sanctions."
Given Suu Kyi's insistence that sanctions do not significantly impact on the general population, it is clear that the opposition leader does not see sanctions as a means of precipitating a socio-economic crisis that could in turn force the regime out of power—a strategy put forth by some sanctions advocates, and condemned by opponents as callous. Some say, however, that in order to have any effect at all, the sanctions must inevitably impose some burden on the general public. "If the goal is to bring the regime to its knees it is likely that people will have to suffer extreme deprivation before the regime starts to buckle. The current sanctions' intensity seems to be way below such a pain threshold for the regime," commented a Singapore-based Burmese economist who asked not be identified.
While both sides debate the impact of sanctions on the Burmese public, general awareness of their existence seems rather low inside Burma, except among the relatively well-educated. Within this group, the debate often centers on the impact of sanctions on prospects for personal advancement, rather than their political significance.
"Last week, we had a talk in Rangoon where one foreigner joined. Almost all of the young journalists and educated guys made strong points against the Western-led economic sanctions," said the editor of a Rangoon-based weekly journal. "Those who have professional potential do not support sanctions. They see them eroding their potential and robbing them of opportunities." Especially damaging, say some domestic critics of sanctions, are efforts to keep out foreign investment—efforts that have, in any case, had only limited success.
"If company X walks out, company Y will come in," remarked one Rangoon-based Burmese economist,speaking on condition of anonymity."In fact, investment sanctions have very limited impact on the regime. It hurts people more, in terms of jobs, income and deprivation of imported goods."
However, investment in large-scale projects such as oil exploration and extraction is seen as bringing little or no benefit to ordinary Burmese. "Unocal's investment, for example, has done little in the way of improving the lives of Burmese," claimed Jeremy Woodrum of the Free Burma Coalition, referring to American oil giant Unocal's investment in the Yadana oil fields. Contrary to claims that such investment raises local living standards, Woodrum points to evidence that Unocal's involvement in Burma "has been responsible for massive rights violations such as murder, torture, rape, forced relocation, and forced labor." He adds that those who suffer the effects of social and environmental damage caused by such projects have no legal means to seek redress inside Burma a fact that has prompted victims to sue Unocal in California courts.
Considering the uncertainty that surrounds most data coming out of Burma, as well as the complexity of the country's social and political circumstances, it would seem obvious that there is no simple, risk-free approach to helping Burma emerge from its protracted political impasse. What is more important than choosing sides in the debate over sanctions, however, is ensuring that geopolitical rivalries don't add more than they already have to Burma's troubles. A combination of sanctions and engagement—the "carrot and stick" approach—may be the most effective means of moving the country forward, but only if implemented in a coordinated manner. In the words of Aung San Suu Kyi: "It is not that either sanctions or engagement is a more effective policy than the other; what we need is a concerted effort from the international community to synergize both strategies to have maximum influence on changes in Burma.