Sanctions? May be ,Maybe not

by David Arnott (Burma Peace Foundation, Geneva)

Summary

On 30 November the measures adopted  in June by the International Labour Conference will take effect, but these cannot be described as sanctions. They might possibly lead to sanctions in some cases, but this will be decided by the ILO constituents (governments, workers and employers) and the ILO's fellow international organisations. On the other hand, the measures provide the Burma support community in its widest sense with a new set of tools for combatting forced labour in Burma and even, perhaps, achieving effective international coordination in developing long-term solutions.

The ILO measures

On 16 November 2000, the Governing  Body of the International Labour Organisation declared by an overwhelming show of hands that it was "not satisfied" that Burma had taken the necessary steps to fulfill the recommendations of the ILO Commission of Inquiry. The measures adopted in June 2000 by the International Labour Conference (ILC) will therefore take effect from 30 November.
 
Out of the 56 members, only China, Russia, Malaysia and India raised their hands to declare themselves "satisfied". Japan and some others did not declare themselves either way. It is regrettable that Japan, India, China and the ASEAN countries could not be drawn into a consensus, even though this might have meant sacrificing one or more of the measures, since they are the countries with the greatest influence on the Burmese military, and their support would have made the ILO action more effective.

Central to the debate were the recommendations of the ILO Commission of Inquiry into forced labour in Burma. These are, in brief, that Burma should (1) bring its legislation into line with ILO Convention 29 which prohibits forced labour (some of Burma's laws, dating back to the British colonial period, permit forced labour); (2) end the recruitment of forced labour in actual practice, particularly by the military; and (3) punish those found guilty of exacting forced labour. If the Governing Body had been satisfied that Burma had adopted the necessary framework for fulfilling these recommendations, the ILC measures would not have been implemented. This did not occur, however.

The measures, which will take effect from 30 November, are:

(a) to decide that the question of the implementation of the Commission of Inquiry's recommendations and of the application of Convention No. 29 by Myanmar should be discussed at future sessions of the International Labour Conference, at a sitting of the Committee on the Application of Standards specially set aside for the purpose, so long as this Member has not been shown to have fulfilled its obligations;

(b) to recommend to the Organization's constituents as a whole -- governments, employers and workers -- that they: (i) review, in the light of the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry, the relations that they may have with the member State concerned and take appropriate measures to ensure that the said Member cannot take advantage of such relations to perpetuate or extend the system of forced or compulsory labour referred to by the Commission of Inquiry, and to contribute as far as possible to the implementation of its recommendations; and (ii) report back in due course and at appropriate intervals to the Governing Body;

(c) as regards international organizations, to invite the Director-General: (i) to inform the international organizations referred to in article 12, paragraph 1, of the Constitution of the Member's failure to comply; (ii) to call on the relevant bodies of these organizations to reconsider, within their terms of reference and in the light of the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry, any cooperation they may be engaged in with the Member concerned and, if appropriate, to cease as soon as possible any activity that could have the effect of directly or indirectly abetting the practice of forced or compulsory labour;
 
(d) regarding the United Nations specifically, to invite the Director-General to request the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to place an item on the agenda of its July 2001 session concerning the failure of Myanmar to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Commission of Inquiry and seeking the adoption of recommendations directed by ECOSOC or by the General Assembly, or by both, to governments and to other specialized agencies and including requests similar to those proposed in paragraphs (b) and (c) above;

(e) to invite the Director-General to submit to the Governing Body, in the appropriate manner and at suitable intervals, a periodic report on the outcome of the measures set out in paragraphs (c) and (d) above, and to inform the international organizations concerned of any developments in the implementation by Myanmar of the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry; (from the ILC resolution, 15 June 2000)

These paragraphs merit careful reading, alongside the conclusions and recommendations of the  report of the Commission of Inquiry, the legal document which is central to the ILO action on Burma. It can be found at www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/= myanmar.htm
 
How the measures might work

These notes are somewhat speculative, and really only deal with measure (b), the recommendation to the ILO constituents.  Measures (c) and  (d) are intriguing, but it is too early to see how they will go. Measures (a) and (e) deal mainly with reporting.

The ILO itself cannot impose sanctions. What it has done by adopting these measures is to call for action by its tripartite constituents and fellow international organisations. The measures give multilateral legitimation to bilateral action by governments, employers, workers and international organisations to take what steps they can to end forced labour in Burma and in particular, make sure their relations with Burma are not used, directly or indirectly,  to increase or abet forced labour. This also means that it will make very little difference if the SPDC stops "cooperating" with the ILO, since the initiative is now with the other actors.

Since this is the first time the ILO has taken such a step, no-one really knows how or even if it will work. It is now up to governments, trade unions,  employers and international organisations to explore what actions they can take with the new powers provided by the measures.  There is a complex set of interactions that could come into play: certain governments, for instance, might not wish to accede to the ILO's request, and there is nothing the ILO can do to force them. However, trade unions in those countries might have a different position, and see it as part of their responsibility under the ILO measures to put pressure on their governments to take action. Or trade unions with members who work for companies trading with or investing in Burma might feel obliged to act within the company - a first step might be serious discussions with the directors. An active government, especially if supported by trade unions and prodded by its neighbourhood Burma support group, might use the measures as extra leverage to persuade a recalcitrant company to withdraw from Burma. We may expect some interesting manoeuvres in France and Belgium involving the trade unions, the two governments and TotalFinaElf (the Franco-Belgian oil company operating in Burma), no doubt chivvied along and cheered on by the French and Belgian Burma groups.

Supporters of democracy in Burma including ethical investment groups, some governments, trade unions, Burma solidarity groups and others will therefore find in these measures a new legal framework for working together on initiatives to end forced labour in Burma (and let us not forget that the Burmese military regime is dependent on forced labour for its survival, since the regime is the army, and the army depends on forced labour for its survival in the field). Such initiatives can now be regarded not as bilateral or individual, but as steps taken at the explicit request of the international community. The measures would makes it much easier for the European Union, for instance, or individual European states such as Britain, to impose sanctions if they think this is the best policy.

Towards coordination

But these synergistic interactions and possibilities, interesting and exciting as they may seem, are unlikely to bring about long-term change unless they are carefully thought out and coordinated at the international and particularly, at the regional level. This means with Burma's neighbours and Japan.

It would be a mistake to think that the region is happy with Burma. The situation in Burma is a problem for everyone, first for its own people, and secondly, for the neighbours. China gets heroin, AIDS, unstable trade and a dead end for the development of Yunnan and neighbouring provinces; India gets heroin, AIDS, unstable borders and refugee flows; Thailand gets a growing methamphetamine crisis, border clashes, eccentric trading restrictions and refugee flows. In addition to the 20,000 or so remaining in the camps, Bangladesh has up to 200,000 "invisible" Rohingya refugees from Burma, as well as a build-up of Burmese troops on the border reminiscent of the events of 1992 which almost led Prime Minister Khalada Zia to take the matter to the Security Council. All the neighbours get an abysmally-managed country sitting right in the middle of the region which as a pariah state is excluded from international assistance and for these and other reasons is a major block to regional development.

What is needed is clearly international and regional coordination to bring Burma back to the rule of law and sensible economic management. This may or may not involve sanctions. The fact that the neighbours use a soft and the Western group a harder approach should not prevent coordination. After all, if someone offering a carrot and another wielding a stick are trying to get a donkey to move to the north-east corner of a field, they can coordinate easily, so long as they agree on where they want the donkey to go, and apply the measures to the appropriate ends. A prosperous, economically stable Burma is in everybody's interest. Perhaps the implementation of the ILO measures will provide an international stimulus and context for a coordinated movement towards this goal.

19 November 2000