Burma demands a cogent policy
Source : Geoffrey Hock, Austin (Texas), Bangkok Post (Mar 07)
Geoffrey Hock is the pseudonym of a Burmese graduate student.
There have been recent, very worrying developments along our border with Burma. They deserve our closest attention and analysis. This is crucial. The last thing that's needed is a knee-jerk response.
Thailand's policy towards Burma appears fragmented. The prime minister has talked about unilateral action against drug lords should Burma fail to agree on drug measures while the defence minister has bragged about his personal contacts with the junta's leaders.
In parliament, former prime minister Chuan Leekpai warned against replacing institutional diplomacy with personal diplomacy. His successor, Thaksin Shinawatra, has now postponed his premature goodwill visit to Burma and military tensions along the border have built up since the new administration assumed office.
How has this fragmentation developed?There are many aspects contributing to the military and diplomatic tensions: the relocation of the Wa along the border, the rush of Shan refugees into northern Thailand, the conflict between the Shan and Wa, the conflict between the Shan and Wa-Rangoon junta military alliance, Burma's capture of a Thai military base, clashes between Thailand and Burma along the border, and the cessation of the border trade. Nobody but Rangoon would dispute those other underlying causes: the drug trade and the deprivation of rights for its ethnic minorities.
If these events were plotted on a flow chart, they would show which were primary and which secondary to the Thai-Burmese relationship.
At the core of every nation's foreign policy is its national interest, with trade usually playing a prominent role. I understand why Thailand has given great weight to trade and opted for the principle of non-interference. But now it must redefine its national interest and decide which deserves the greater emphasis: trade or drugs.
Drug problems have been a constant worry to Thailand but now they seem to have got out of hand. Also very worrying for the Thai and the Burmese people is the alliance between the Wa and the Burmese military. Is it a temporary alliance to defeat the Shan insurgency? Or is it an institutional alliance?And what about the relocation of the Wa? What is behind Rangoon's support for the move? Who initiated the relocation: the Wa themselves, Rangoon, or China? The only thing that is clear is that Rangoon is calling the shots.
The Burmese military's gambit in dealing with drug lords is due to the expectation that the enormous wealth amassed by the drug kingpins will eventually filter through the economy and make them give up drug production when they can find legitimate means of making money.
Thus, the regime has become the world's biggest laundromat for drug money. It has given shelter to the world's most wanted drug czar, Khun Sa, and has granted him trade and development licences. The Burmese economy has fallen into the laps of the extended families of drug lords and their organisations.
The junta has borrowed from the Asian Wealth group, widely believed to be backed by the drug business, millions of dollars for diesel oil used to generate electricity. Thus the drug world has become part of the Burmese establishment.
This is possible because Burma now has the most corrupt regime in its history. The greed of some of the junta's generals and other officers is just as insatiable as the worst rulers of the past. The opacity of the current dictatorship allows some generals to exercise power arbitrarily and absolutely.
The military alliance between the Wa and Burmese army is the latest institutional alliance. Are they taking positions along the Burmese border to impress upon the Shan insurgents (or the Thai military) their solidarity?I feel there is the very real possibility of the emergence of a narco-military state in Southeast Asia and it sends a cold shiver down my spine.
Can the Burmese and Thais afford to accept Rangoon's gambit? Can we place our lives at the mercy of drug czars?The narco-military state at the national or local level in Burma will hurt both Burmese and Thais. It will have a devastating effect on the whole region, including India and China.
As long as Thailand fails to recognise the possible emergence of a Burmese narco-military state and does not think through the consequences for the region, there can never be a cohesiveness of policy formulation.
Any unilateral action taken by the prime minister will amount to nothing unless all in the region, India and China included, come to terms with what is happening in Burma. And any premature adventurism may tilt the balance of power towards the junta's hardliners and delay the transition to democracy.
Thai policy-makers should also consider the "historical continuity" in the make-up of Burmese governments. Some Burmese scholars point out that the military rule since 1962 is just a revival of the Burmese monarchy-equipped with modern instruments of state.
It was the usual practice of a militant king to consolidate his power and organise his kingdom through sporadic wars against his neighbours rather than engaging in social and economic developments. His unifying call was the imminent foreign threat, whether real or imagined.
The current regime, now in the midst of a political, social, economic and diplomatic crisis, has learned from the past. And any unilateral action by the Thai prime minister may hasten its adoption of the ways of yore.
Thailand needs to do some serious homework before taking any action.